Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.
Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating on the marriage market since 1960? How does positive assortative mating in the marriage market contribute to income inequality across households? These two questions are addressed here. To answer them, samples of hundreds of thousands of households from the United States Census Bureau are analyzed for the period 1960 to 2005.
I. The Rise in Positive Assortative Mating
Start with the first question: Has there been a rise in positive assortative mating in marriage across U.S. households? To address this question, consider a regression between a wife's educational level and her husband's. In particular, a regression of the following form is run for the years y D 1960; 1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2005: Here EDU h my and EDU w my represent the years of education for the husband and wife in marriage m for year y. The variable YEAR t y is a time dummy. It is set up so that YEAR t y D 1, if t D y, and YEAR t y D 0, if t 6 D y, where t 2 T f1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2005g 10, 78457 Konstanz, Germany (email: georgi@georgikocharkov.com); Santos: University of Mannheim, L7, 3-5, Department of Economics, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (email: santos@uni-mannheim.de). Additionally, Nezih Guner thanks the European Research Council (ERC Grant 263600). Additional information about this research is provided in the online appendix.
YEAR t y D 0, for all t, when y D 1960. The coefficient t gives the additional impact of a husband's education on his wife's relative to the baseline year, 1960. The evolution of t over time speaks to changes in the degree of assortative mating. The regression also includes a fixed effect for each year as measured by the constants and t . The t 's control for the secular rise in the educational levels for the married population. The lefthand side panel of Figure 1 plots the upshot of the regression analysis. As can be seen, t rises over time, implying that the degree of assortative mating has increased.
The levels of education are collapsed into five categories for the rest of the analysis: less than high school (H S ), high school (H S), some college (C ), college (C), and post college (CC). Kendall's rank correlation is computed between a husband's and wife's education for each year. The changes in Kendall's over time are illustrated in Figure 1 , righthand side panel. While the series displays some nonmonotonicity, Kendall's is clearly higher in 2005 relative to 1960.
Last, the pattern of assortative mating between a husband's and wife's educational levels can be examined in a contingency table, as the upper panel in Table 1 does. Each cell in the contingency table has two entries. The first entry gives the observed fraction of married households in the cell, while the second number displays the fraction that would occur if matching was random. The diagonal of the contingency table describes the matches that occur when husband and wife have identical educational levels, both for the observed matches and when they are random. Take sum along the diagonal for each of these two types of matches, actual and random. Next, compute the ratio of the actual to random matches and denote it by . This ratio is also plotted in Figure 1 , righthand side panel, for the years 1960; 1970;
; 2005. First, as can be seen, there is positive assortative mating. That is, the ratios are larger than one, implying that the number of matches between husband and 1 wife with the identical education level is larger than what would occur if matching was random. Second, they increase over time. Greenwood et al. (2013) present a structural model of this rise in positive assortative mating.
II. Assortative Mating and Income Inequality
Turn to the second question: How does marital sorting affect household income inequality? Interest in this question is not without precedence. For example, Cancian and Reed (1998) and Schwartz (2010) both conclude that an increase in assortative mating has led to a rise in income inequality. The current research addresses this question using an accounting-based methodology, which is quite different from other studies. Some income statistics for married households by educational class are presented in the lower panel of Table 1 . Again, each cell has two entries. The first number gives the married household's income relative to mean income in the economy across all households, married and/or single. The second number is the share of the wife's labor income in household labor income. In 1960 if a woman with a less-than-highschool education (H S ) married a similarly educated man their household income would be 77 percent of mean household income. If that same woman married a man with a college education (C) then household income would be 124 percent of the mean. Alternatively, in 2005 if a woman with post-college education (CC) marries a man with a less-than-high-school education their income would be 92 percent of mean household income. This rises to 219 percent if her husband also has a post-college education. So, at some level, sorting matters for household income.
A. Constructing Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients
Let f i j denote the fraction of households in the U.S. that are of type i in income percentile j and r i j represent the income of such a household relative to mean household income. The percentile index j is expressed in terms of fractions (e.g., 0.10 instead of 10). The types are classified as follows: There are married and single households. In a married household each person is indexed by one of the above educational levels. The wife is also categorized by whether she works or not. There are ten income percentiles (deciles) so j 2 f0:1; 0:2;
; 1:0g. This leads to 550 .i; j/-combinations of households in total for each year. The share of aggregate income that percentile j accounts for, s j , is given by s j D P i f i j r i j . The cumulative share of income at percentile p is thus l p P p j s j D P p j P i f i j r i j . A Lorenz curve plots l p against p D P p j P i f i j . The Gini coefficient, g, is twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45 0 line. If p moves continuously then the Gini coefficient is defined by g D 2 R 1 0 jl p pjdp, where 0 g 1. A higher value for g implies a greater degree of income inequality. The Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient are clearly functions of the f i j 's and the r i j 's, for all i and j, so write l p D LORENZ p .f f i j g; fr i j g/ and g D GINI.f f i j g; fr i j g/.
The 
B. Assortative versus Random Matching
Suppose that matching was random instead of assortative. What would have happened to the income distributions in 1960 and 2005? To do this experiment the observed pattern of matching for married couples shown in the contingency table is replaced by the pattern that would occur if matching was random. Let M represent that set of indices for married couples and S be the set for singles. The experiment involves replacing the observed f f i j g's for .i; j/ 2 M with the set that would obtain if matching was random, denoted by f e f i j g for .i; j/ 2 M. The counterfactual Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient are given by LORENZ p .f f 0 i j g; fr i j g/ and GINI.f f 0 i j g;
The results of the counterfactual experiment are interesting. Moving from the observed pattern of assortative matching in 1960 to a random pattern has little discernible impact on income inequality. The Gini coefficient drops only slightly to 0.33. Repeating the experiment for 2005 has a marked impact on the income distribution, that is shown in the lefthand side panel of Figure 3 . As can be seen, the Lorenz curve shifts in and the Gini drops from 0.43 to 0.34. (The analogous diagram for 1960 is not shown since the shift in the Lorenz curve is not noticeable.) Why does this experiment affect the Lorenz curve for 2005 but not 1960? This question will be addressed now.
C. Matching and Married Female Labor-Force Participation
For positive assortative matching to have an impact on income inequality married females must work. Married females worked more in 2005 than 1960. The righthand side panel of Figure 4 shows married female labor-force participation by percentile. As can be seen, across all income percentiles labor-force participation was higher in 2005 versus 1960, but the increase is most precipitous at the highest percentiles. For example, at the 80th percentile 42 percent of married women worked in 1960. This rose to 77 percent in 2005. At the 20th percentile the numbers are 25 and 34 percent. The lefthand side panel of Figure 4 shows the contribution of the wife's labor income to household labor income, again by percentile. The wife's contribution to household labor income is significantly larger in 2005 relative to 1960. This share rises with the income percentile. At the 80th percentile the share that married woman provided to household income rose from 16 to 34 percent, and from 13 to 25 percent at the 20th percentile.
To examine the impact of married female labor-force participation (MFLP) and sorting on income inequality, undertake this thought experiment. Assume that matching is random in the years 1960 and 2005 with one twist: assume that in 1960 married woman participate in the labor force at their 2005 levels and that in 2005 they work at their 1960 levels. The resulting Gini coefficients are 0.32 and 0.45. When matching is random, married female labor-force participation has a significant dampening effect on income inequality for the year 2005. Ran-dom sorting works to equalize incomes across households in 2005 because it diversifies income across husbands and wives. But, this effect is only operational to the extent that married women work. (That is, for 2005 compare 0.34 with 0.45.) Random matching has less of an effect in 1960 than in 2005. Incomes are less polarized in 1960, as Figure 1 and Table 1 both show.
Another interesting question to ask is what would have happened to income inequality if couples in 2005 matched as in 1960. That is, replace the 2005 contingency table with the 1960 one. This experiment is somewhat tricky to operationalize. In 2005 people were much more educated than in 1960. The fractions of wives (husbands) in the various educational groups can be obtained by summing each column (row) across the rows (columns). In other words, the marginal distributions for husbands and wives linked with the contingency tables have changed across 1960 and 2005. The marginal distributions for females are shown in Table 1 , upper panel. The rise in educational attainment for females is readily apparent.
A standardized contingency table for the years 1960 and 2005 can be constructed to control for this. The essential idea is that shifts in the marginal distributions across nonstandardized contingency tables can distort the comparison of the core patterns of association between the variables in the tables. Using the iterative procedure outlined in Mosteller (1968) Relative sum of diagonals, TABLE 1-CONTINGENCY TABLE: ASSORTATIVE MATING AND INCOME ONLINE APPENDIX: GREENWOOD, GUNER, KOCHARKOV AND SANTOS (2014)
A1. Data
The data used for this paper is freely available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) website. The samples used in this study are taken from the 1 percent sample of the Census for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for the year 2005. The following variables were included for every year: year or the survey (variable name: year), spouse location flag (sploc), number of family members in the household (famsize), number of children in the household (nchild), age (age), sex (sex), marital status (marst), educational attainment (educ), employment status (empstat), total family income (ftotinc), wage and salary income (incwage). Only singles and married couples that are 25 to 54 years old are considered. The adults in these households either live by themselves or with their children, who are less than 19 years old. Households in which there are other members such as grandparents, uncles/aunts, or other unrelated individuals are excluded. Households with subfamilies of any other type are also excluded from the analysis. Finally, widows, widowers and married individuals whose spouses are absent are excluded as well. Income variables are restricted to be non-negative.
There are 560 types of households used in the analysis. Households are broken down into finer categories than are reported in the text. In principle, this doesn't affect the analysis, since the finer classifications can be combined to attain the more aggregated ones. Following a counterfactual experiment, some households are moved into new income percentiles. So, in practice the finer classification allows more accurate re-sorting into the various income percentile when conducting the counterfactual experiments. Households are classified into different types as follows: 1) Marital status: married, never married males, never married females, divorced males, divorced females.
2) Education: less than high school, high school, some college, college, more than college. For married households, both the husband and wife will have one of these educational levels.
3) Market work: work, does not work. For married households both the husband and wife will have one of these levels of labor market activity. 4) Children: no children, 1 child, 2 children, more than 2 children.
Finally, households are divided into 10 deciles. So, for every year, there are 5,600 .i; j/-combinations of household types/deciles.
A2. The Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient
Think of a sample of different household types, i 2 f1; 2; :::; mg, situated in different percentiles, j 2 J , of the income distribution. Again, j is expressed as a fraction. Define f i j as the fraction of households that are of type-i in income percentile j. Let r i j represent household .i; j/'s income, y i j , relative to mean income, y. Each household's income is adjusted to a per-adult-equivalent basis using the OECD modified equivalence scale, which counts the first adult as 1, the second adult as 0.5 and each child as 0.3 adults. Equivalized households incomes are then divided by mean household income across the whole sample.
The share of income earned by percentile j is
The Lorenz curve is derived by plotting the cumulative shares of the population indexed by percentile p, on the x-axis, against the cumulative share of income indexed by percentile p,
on the y-axis. Suppose that the unit interval is split up into n equally sized segments. Then, j 2 J D f1=n; ; 1 1=n; 1g.
Take the example of n D 4 (quartiles). The Lorenz curve described above is plotted in Figure 1 . The Gini coefficient associated with the Lorenz curve equals twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. Alternatively, the coefficient can be calculated as equaling 1 21, where 1 is the area below the Lorenz Curve. In the case of quartiles the area 1 is the summation of the areas of the right triangle A, the right trapezoids B, C, and D. The coordinates on the x-axis are given by 0, p 1 D 0:25, p 2 D 0:5, p 3 D 0:75, and 1:0. The y-axis coordinates of the Lorenz curve are given by 0, l 0:25 , l 0:5 , l 0:75 , and 1:0.
Then, using the formulas for the geometric areas A, B, C, and D, the Gini coefficient, g, can be derived as
After rearranging and canceling out terms, the expression for the Gini coefficient can be simplified to g D . p 1 l 2 p 2 l 1 / C . p 2 l 3 p 3 l 2 / C . p 3 l 3 /:
The cumulative shares of the population, the p's, are based on quartiles; i.e., p 1 D 1=4; p 2 D 2=4;
. Thus, above expression can be rewritten as
In the more general case of n percentiles, the Gini coefficient equals
The version of this formula for an arbitrary number of income groups of any size and an arbitrary number of sub-populations (types) is presented in Rao (1969) .
A3. Counterfactual Experiments

IMPOSING RANDOM MATCHING
Random matching can be imposed on the demographic structure of the U.S. population for each of these years in the sample. Counterfactual Gini coefficients can then be computed. How is this done? First a bit of notation. Take the distribution of household, f f i j g. Recall that married households are indexed by the education of the husband, the education of the wife, their labor-force participation, and the number of children in the household. Let the sets M E H contain the indices of all married households with a husband who has the educational level, E H 2 fH S ; H S; C ; C; CCg, where H S refers to a less-than-high-school educated person, H S refers to someone with a high-school education, C is some college, C is college, and CC is more-than-college educated. Similarly, the sets M E W contain married households with different educational levels for wives, E W . Furthermore, M L F P H .M L F P W / contain all the married households with a husband's (wife's) labor-force participation status L F P H .W / 2 fW O R K H .W / ;~W O R K H .W / g. Finally, the set M K I DS contain married households with a particular number of children K I DS 2 f0; 1; 2; 2Cg. The set of all married households with a particular mix of the education, M E H ;E W , for the husband and the wife reads
Let M represent the set containing all of the different types of married households. Clearly,
where the term in parenthesis is the set of all married households of type .E H ; E W , L F P H , L F P W ; K I DS/.
Here is an example illustrating how the random matching experiment is performed. Take the first element of the matching table in 1960-see Table 1 of the main text. These are the marriages where both the husband and the wife are less-than-high-school educated. In 1960, the fraction of such marriages was 0.32. In terms of the current notation, Now impose the random matching table entry for these marriages-again, see Table 1 of the main text. The elements in the contingency table refer to the fraction of all married households that a particular type of match between husbands' and wives' educational levels constitutes. The elements in the cells are totals across all income percentiles. The f i j 's refer to the fraction of all households, married and single, that are of type i in income percentile j. Therefore, the cells in the contingency The impact of random matching on inequality can be interacted with changes in the labor-force participation decisions of married females. The procedure for imposing random matching in 1960 is outlined in the previous section. Suppose that in addition to imposing random matching in 1960, married female labor-force participation is fixed at its 2005 level. How can this be implemented?
The married female labor-force participation rate in 1960 when random matching is imposed is P Table A2 . By comparing the standardized table for 1960 with the one in the data for 2005 (see Table 1 in the text) it can be seen that assortative mating has increased. Once again, the diagonal elements are larger in the table for 2005. Likewise, a comparison of the standardized table for 2005 with the one in the data for 1960 shows an increase in assortative mating (again, see Table 1 in the text).
A5. A Brief Literature Review
The increase in assortative mating in the U.S. has also been examined by Hou and Myles (2008) , Lam (1997) , Qian and Preston (1993) , and Schwartz and Mare (2005) to name a few papers. Siow (2013) documents an increase in educational homogamy, but not a general increase in positive assortative matching. Lam (1997) and Schwartz (2010) discuss the relationship between assortative mating and income inequality. Cancian and Reed (1998, 1999) also focus on the role that married female-labor force participation plays in the relationship between assortative mating and income inequality .  TABLE A1-STANDARDIZED CONTINGENCY TABLE: ASSORTATIVE MATING 
